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Almost all African states experience substantial and widespread political insecurity in a variety of forms.
This analysis explains how relationships between groups and governments create incentives and dis-
incentives for distinct forms of political violence to emerge. It argues that ethno-regional communities
across Africa are situated within a power hierarchy that determines their relative importance to, and
inclusion in, regimes. A dynamic power landscape emerges from relative group positions. Various po-
sitions within a hierarchy are associated with particular dominant forms of organized political violence
as groups challenge political elites, but are bounded by their goals and characteristics. A failure to
consider the political hierarchies and landscapes operating within African states has led to an under
speciﬁcation of the causal mechanisms driving different forms of violence, and an overstatement of
beneﬁts from declining civil war rates and inclusive governing coalitions.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Almost all African states experience substantial and widespread
political insecurity in a variety of forms throughout their territory
(Raleigh, Linke, Hegre,& Carlsen, 2010). This analysis highlights the
variety in, and explanations for, political violence. It argues that
ethno-regional communities across Africa are situated within a
power hierarchy that determines their relative importance to, and
inclusion in, regimes; these relative group positions create a dy-
namic power landscape. Positions within governance hierarchies
are associated with a dominant form of conﬂict as relationships
between governments and groups create incentives and disincen-
tives for distinct forms of political violence. A failure to consider the
political hierarchies and landscapes operating within African states
has led to an under speciﬁcation of the causal mechanisms driving
different forms of violence, and an overstatement of beneﬁts from
declining civil war rates and inclusive governing coalitions.
Many conﬂict researchers explore explanations for conﬂict
variation and occurrence. Studies distinguish whether states
experience a ‘revolutionary’ or ‘separatist’ civil war (Buhaug, 2006);
whether communal or ‘livelihood’ violence is triggered by envi-
ronmental change (Raleigh, 2010a; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012;
Straus, 2011); or how ‘warlord’ violence, characterized by high
rates of criminal activity and violence against civilians (see Bates,
2008; Reno, 1998), is the basis of the ‘new war’ thesis (Kaldor,
1999). The underlying motive often differentiates violence: the
greed versus grievance literature proposes that ‘sons of the soil’
contests (Fearon, 2006) differ from those aiming to control the stateand access rents and resources (Collier & Hoefﬂer, 2002, 2004; Le
Billon, 2001). Recent research suggests that a key source of het-
erogeneity in civil wars is rebellion technology, itself a function of
the relative balance of power between opponents (Kalyvas &
Balcells, 2010). Violence types differ on levels of public support,
funding sources (Weinstein, 2007), or by the use of child soldiers
and sexual violence (see Dixon, 2009). These studies further our
understanding about how speciﬁc forms of violence are produced,
but no explanation yet offers speciﬁc distinctions between types of
violence, how those forms are deliberately shaped by groups, found
in speciﬁc locations, and strategically scaled on the local, regional
and national levels.1 Using present theories of conﬂict, how and
why multiple forms of violence emerge in countries such as DR-
Congo, Nigeria and Kenya is unexplained. This is a quite serious
limitation.
This article argues that multiple, distinct forms of political
violence co-occur within states but have limited rates of spatial
overlap. Heterogeneous violence is a result of subnational political
processes that triggers its emergence.
A broad deﬁnition of political violence allows for an examina-
tion into its heterogeneity, spatial characteristics and variation in
occurrence. ‘Political violence’ is the use of force by a group with a
political purpose or motivation, often designed to secure resources,
and access or alter paths to power. A key determinant of African
political violence is that political, ethnic, religious or regional
groups and areas are targeted.2 For the purpose of this analysis,
non-state political violence is classiﬁed into three forms: civil wars,
militia violence, and communal conﬂict. These forms differ based on
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violence: Civil wars involve a primary cleavage of rebels against an
established government, where the objective is to replace the
regime or establish a separate state (Gleditsch, Wallensteen,
Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Sambanis, 2004). These
enduring contests often subsume large areas of a state and result in
high military and civilian fatalities. Political militias operate as
‘private armies’ for political elites broadly including regimes (e.g.
Janjaweed in Sudan), members of governments (e.g. Mungiki in
Kenya); and political opponents (e.g. Boko Haram in Nigeria)
(Raleigh, 2014). These armed groups are often used by politicians to
compete over access to power; conﬂicts are frequently limited in
spatial scope and fatalities are signiﬁcantly fewer than civil wars.
Communal contests are local encounters between identity-based
groups including ethnic, regional, religious or livelihood commu-
nities. These conﬂicts emerge over territorial disputes, local power
disparities, resource access and historical disagreements. These
three categories represent a continuum of organized political
violence from local uprisings to coordinated violence over state
power.3
Each form displays differences in rates of activity, targeting, and
spatial patterns: according to the Armed Conﬂict Location and
Event Data (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010) from 1997 to 2013, rebel
groups in civil wars spend half of their active time engaging with
military forces, and one quarter on civilian attacks; the activity of
individual groups last for over a year. In contrast,militias spend the
majority of active time attacking civilians, but these acts result in
fewer fatalities per event, and discrete groups endure for less than
half a year with no signiﬁcant change in governments resulting
from their activity. Communal conﬂict is often repeated and sea-
sonal; it is divided between battles with ethnically or regionally
identiﬁed opponents, or attacks on civilians within those commu-
nities. High fatality rates are common across communal contests.
Across types, individual groups may practice multiple modalities
and tactics of violence, including terrorism (threats and random-
ized violence, often upon civilians), electoral violence, rebellion,
and insurgency strategies.
These characteristics not only suggest that types of political
violence are different, but that they are potentially non-
substitutable, as each form is directed towards achieving an
exclusive political goal. Furthermore, the occurrence of each type is
spatially distinct, and the level of overlap between types varies
within the same state (see Table 1)4: overlap is low between militia
and communal violence, lowest between civil war and communal
violence, and highest between civil war areas and militia activity.
Distinct conﬂict types are found in separate locations, but they
co-occur within states. Particular constellations of temporal co-
occurrence are common: in weak states such as DR-Congo, Soma-
lia or Nigeria, civil wars, political militia activity and communalTable 1
Overlap between active locations for three forms of political violence.
Spatial overlap Civil
war
Political
militia
Communal
militia
Annual Civil war 100% 17% 6%
Political militia 20% 100% 9%
Communal
violence
17% 22% 100%
Static
zones (15 km)a
Civil war 100% 31% 20%
Political militia 35% 100% 30%
Communal
violence
36% 47% 100%
a Static statistics are calculated by recording if any form of violence occurred and
overlapped within a grid square at any time between 1997 and 2011. A 15 km buffer
is placed upon all conﬂict points to account.violence are found in different areas within the same state. In Ivory
Coast and Chad, civil wars and militia violence simultaneously
occur throughout the state. In multiple countries experiencing
unstable democratic transitions (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania), political
militia activity and communal violence occur with limited local
overlap. The subnational variation in occurrence suggests that the
form of conﬂict in which communities engage may be in response
to local characteristics, and the presence of a heterogeneous
mechanism creating incentives and disincentives for particular
forms of violence to emerge.
This article investigates how subnational regime practices
structure the motivations and mechanisms of ethno-regional
communities to engage in different forms of co-occurring political
violence within and across African states. Much of the intra-state
conﬂict literature uses ‘governance’ as a blunt instrument,
explaining local differences in violence as a result of state capacity
vacuums (Hendrix, 2010; Sobek, 2010; Thies, 2010), weak legiti-
macy (Clapham, 1996; Englebert, 2000), regime characteristics (see
Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001) or a breakdown of order
(Reno, 2011). Increasingly, research aims to integrate subnational
practices, acknowledge the state as a non-neutral actor, and ethno-
regional groups as active political agents (Cederman, Min, &
Wimmer, 2010). These advancements provide the base for a
robust explanation of the changing patterns of violence within
African states and the continent as a whole.
Regimes position ethno-regional groups within a power hier-
archy and, in doing so, create relative and absolute differences in
political authority, capacity, and agency. These ‘political in-
equalities’ are formalized through inclusive or exclusive policies.
Variable governance relationships produce a spatial landscape of
power, and the parameters of each relationship create incentives
and disincentives for particular forms of spatially distinct political
violence to emerge across that landscape. For example, a discrim-
inated and powerless large group may choose to initiate a civil war
in order to usurp power from a regime; however in the same state,
agents or allies of the regime may want to limit an opponent by
producing targeted and strategic violence through a militia. An
underlying assumption is that groups engage in a conﬂict form that
returns the greatest beneﬁts, and maximizes power gains while
bounded by their political, economic and social circumstances. This
is a robust explanation for multiple, concurrent conﬂict types
compared to subnational ‘horizontal’ factors including wealth,
poverty, ethnic group size, and ‘geographic’ factors incorporating
resource abundance or scarcity.
This idea borrows from the ‘topographies’ of governance liter-
ature (see Boone, 2003; Gupta & Ferguson, 1992) in an effort to
address theories of local differences in power, development, au-
tonomy and conﬂict. It so builds on the emerging, disaggregated
‘geography of conﬂict’ literature, which shows clear differences in
conﬂict and non-conﬂict spaces, and suggests differences in actors,
characteristics, and triggers (Cederman & Girardin, 2007;
Cederman, Min, & Wimmer, 2010). It seeks to broaden these
strands of research by looking at the dominant, common forms of
conﬂict, while incorporating local political dynamics as an expla-
nation for variation. In contributing to these literature, it serves as a
basis for an alternative theory of conﬂict that emphasizes the
agency of communities, the importance of scale, the variation in
violence, and the consequences of local governance practices.
This article proceeds as follows: the second section reviews
theoretical frameworks on subnational governance and conﬂict
across Africa and suggests hypotheses based on positions within
ethno-regional hierarchies. The third section is a review of the
recently available data on governance and conﬂict. The fourth
section tests the hypotheses and ﬁnds support for several; the ﬁfth
section discusses and concludes the study.
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Governance is an inherently spatial process, where the impact of
inconsistent capacity and control causes subnational variation in
government practice, regional integration, development and peace.
Subnational theories of conﬂict argue that violent spaces differ
from peaceful areas, and those differences across locations are
manifestations of an underlying governance process. Three
frameworks explain conﬂict as a function of governance, yet differ
in which mechanisms create subnational variation in authority and
the incentives and disincentives for violence. The ‘control vs.
contest’ narrative largely focuses on how poverty and physical ge-
ography conspire to limit the effective reach of the state and create
opportunities for potential opponents; the ‘horizontal inequality’
literature considers how political and economic inclusion and
exclusion are manifestations of government interest and power
across states. Resulting marginalization motivates opponents. The
‘hierarchy and landscapes’ perspective acknowledges government
power and stability as functions of how effectively various politi-
cally relevant ethno-regional communities are incorporated,
restricted or repressed over space. Each details how a ‘topography’
of violence results from governance, or lack thereof.
Control vs. contest
The subnational geography literature rests on the notion that
the physical and demographic attributes of states create both pools
and vacuums of power, where geography creates interplays be-
tween strategy, strength and opportunity.
The ‘control’ narrative argues that states are limited by poverty
and the physical challenges of large states, low infrastructure, and
difﬁcult terrain. In turn, low state capacity corresponds to more
opportunities for groups to rebel and motivation to contest an
absent ruling power. Conﬂicts therefore should occur in rural, pe-
ripheral areas or those with rough terrain. Herbst (2000) argues
that states use their limited resources to control only areas of de-
mographic and economic signiﬁcance, Fearon and Laitin (2003)
posit that large ‘ungoverned’, inaccessible areas are more likely to
experience civil war, and also serve as a basis for separatist
violence. Multiple authors suggest that terrain inﬂuences the
likelihood of insurgency or that state size creates higher risk: Green
(2012) notes that because African states are, on average, 2.4 times
larger than European states, their innate risk of conﬂict is higher
(see Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). Alternative manifestations of the
‘control’ thesis correlate conﬂict with pre-colonial political orga-
nization, colonialist design and post-colonial orders (Crowder,
1968; Herbst, 2000; Young, 1994).
A counter to the control narrative suggests the opposite condi-
tions lead to violence: large states have more violence, but not at a
per-capita rate (Raleigh & Hegre, 2009), and areas with difﬁcult
terrain are less likely to experience civil war battles compared to
accessible areas (Buhaug & Rød, 2005; Raleigh, 2010b; Raleigh &
Hegre, 2009). Populated, high value target locations (e.g. resource
zones) experience more conﬂict as maximizing support and re-
sources to allow for continued opposition (Le Billon, 2001). Conﬂict
arises due to contests for power, where opposition forces are suf-
ﬁciently strong to counter state military power.
‘Control’ and ‘contest’ frameworks often disaggregate conﬂicts
to ‘separatist’ and ‘revolutionary’ civil wars5 (Buhaug & Rød, 2005),
and are largely restricted to determining static contexts in which
conﬂict is more common. If either explanation is uniformly accu-
rate, then conﬂicts should occur in ﬁxed geographic locations
determined by state capacity, physical characteristics, and potential
collective action abilities which may beneﬁt nascent groups
(Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). But violence forms and locations varywidely within and across states, emerging in isolated areas and
villages, regional centers, and capital cities.
Absolute and relative inequalities
The ‘inequality’ framework suggests that states are not neutral
agents in their expression of power and privilege, but create access
to public and private goods on a ‘club’ basis. In African states, the
included/excluded dynamics are associated with ethno-regional
communities, as the political environment is strongly structured
along ethnicized patron and client institutions (Chabal & Daloz,
1999; Stewart, 2008). Governments ensure political survival by
maintaining the provision of private and public goods to their
supportive bases.
‘Horizontal inequalities’ result from governing policies where
‘excluded’ groups experience relative deprivation, in contrast to the
favored position of ‘included’ communities (for a critique, see
Kasara, 2007). Exclusion along ethnic lines leads to limited repre-
sentation in public ofﬁces (Bangura, 2006), poorer levels of health
and education, greater income inequalities (Barron, 2008; Stewart,
2008), and limited public good provision (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999).
Active ‘grievances’ connect political and economic horizontal
inequalities with intra and inter-state variation in subnational
conﬂict. A positive relationship exists between increased conﬂict
and the presence and depth of economic inequality experienced by
ethnic or religious identity groups (Buhaug, Gleditsch, Holtemann,
Østby, & Tollefsen, 2011; Østby, 2008a, 2008b; Stewart, 2008).
Further, poverty compounded with social or political inequality
leads to higher violence rates (Stewart, Brown, & Langer, 2008).
Spatial economic inequalities by group or region are increasingly
important in explaining the onset of violence: areas with higher
rates of regional poverty are considered more conﬂict prone, as are
spaces of high inequality in heterogeneous societies (Buhaug et al.
2011; Cederman, Wiedmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Deiwiks,
Cederman, & Skrede Gleditsch, 2012; Gubler & Selway, 2012;
Murshed & Gates, 2005; Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2009).
Yet, economic marginalization may be neither sufﬁcient nor
necessary for explaining subnational violence. Increasingly, the
differential provision of higher rates of power and public goods
access is associated with violence. Stewart (2008) maintains that
many horizontal inequalities are tolerated provided political in-
clusion is widespread; Cederman et al. (2011) ﬁnd that regardless of
relative wealth, discrimination and powerlessness produce higher
rates of ethno-nationalist conﬂict.
Horizontal inequality frameworks propose that the poor and
politically marginalized are most likely to revolt, if mobilization
conditions aremet. Yet this conclusion is difﬁcult to rectify with the
known distribution of poverty and conﬂict risk and the necessary
conditions for rebellion. Despite legitimate grievances against a
national government, the poorest communities within states do
not launch rebel groups, as they often do not have the opportunities
(e.g. funds, resources, support) to do so and are unlikely to create
the alliances necessary to gather sufﬁcient strength to challenge
governments (Collier & Hoefﬂer, 2002; Østby & de Soysa, 2008).
Instead, the poorest groups are likely to be the most politically
disenfranchised (Cramer, 2003) and those outside of the political
system are more likely to engage in local contests with other local
groups of similar size and stature (Raleigh, 2010a).
Outside of civil wars and related ‘ethnonationalist’ and seces-
sionist conﬂicts, how inequality and marginalization create in-
centives and disincentives for alternative and multiple forms of
violence is left unaddressed in the horizontal inequality literature.
Indeed, relatively static economic factors do not have sufﬁcient
ﬂexibility to explainmultiple, different forms of conﬂict, or propose
Most Included in Regime
National Power Scale
Least Included in Regime
Dominant/Monopoly
|
Partners (Senior & Junior)
|
Powerless
|
Discriminated
|
Politically Irrelevant
Fig. 1. Political hierarchy.
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which they engage. If all violence did occur in the same relative
spaces (e.g. poor areas), the determining factor would be the col-
lective action capabilities of the rebelling group, and would not
speak to the comparative advantages different groups have to
engage in political violence.
Political hierarchies and landscapes
A third variation on subnational rule argues that governments,
vertical power structures and politicized communities can explain
both the variation and type of subnational conﬂict. This literature
maintains that regimes rule according to a complex calculus of
balancing power interests, and are dependent on a range of sub-
national alliances, allegiances, and exclusionary policies to bolster
stability (Boone, 1998; Chabal & Daloz, 1999); in turn, these create
‘governance topographies’ (Boone, 2003). Positions within political
hierarchies are associated with distinct opportunities and motiva-
tions for particular forms of conﬂict. The spatial clustering of
politicized ethno-regional groups creates landscapes of concurrent
conﬂict.
Previous political hierarchies position African ethno-regional
groups into static categories of political ‘relevance’ and ‘irrele-
vance’ (Posner, 2004), determined by demography, economic po-
wer, national history and positions within past and present
governments. Politically relevant (PR) groups are large, live in
economically successful areas, and have a substantial role in na-
tional politics, while politically irrelevant (PIR) groups include
those are that historically marginalized, demographically small,
geographically disparate and largely considered the poorest and
most vulnerable in society. The political contests of PIR groups are
largely local in nature.6
Alternative hierarchies distinguish ethno-regional groups by
how they aggregate for political contests. Scarritt and Mozaffar
(1999) create national, regional and local ‘relevance’ categories
wherein groups choose alternate political identities depending on
the scale of the political issue at hand. Scale determines the identity
that allows a group to maximize power relations and minimize the
size of issue coalitions.7 This interpretation of relevance suggests
that the political aspirations of groups are bounded, but alliances
across communities and issues can create strategic opportunities.
Yet, the scaled ‘relevance’ perspective retains a static interpretation
of power between group and regime and across groups.
A dynamic, spatial expression of power is necessary to explain
variation in positions and political violence. The topography of
governance framework builds upon ethno-regional politicization
and hierarchical government-group relationships to argue that
regimes engage in co-option, alliances, allegiances, negotiations,
repressions and non-incorporation across communities to maxi-
mize stability and longevity (Boone, 2003; Thies, 2009; Tilly, 1985).
This produces a pyramid of power relations between the govern-
ment and ethno-regional communities (Boone, 2003; Gupta &
Ferguson, 1992), where a group's position reﬂects how central it
is to the composition and legitimacy of the ruling regime. These
positions are also relative to other ethno-political groups who are
contending for access to executive power.
The logic behind this interpretation of governance is that
leaders of heterogeneous states have multiple potential rivals to
placate and incorporate, rather than simply repress. A hierarchical
framework allows access to power for the select groups deemed to
be most critical in maximizing regime scope and longevity, while
excluding groups who may threaten it. Across a state at any time,
those groups in power or allied to those in power are juxtaposed
with excluded groups who occupy positions of powerlessness,
discrimination, and autonomy. Hence, positions within a politicalhierarchy are determined by whether groups are integrated into
national politics by constituting part of the regime, or remain
external through repression, discrimination, or irrelevance. Both
are situated above those with little or no political strength or
relevance (i.e. politically irrelevant) (Cederman et al. 2010). Fig. 1 is
an illustration of the political hierarchy.
The contours of subnational governance relationships change as
regimes consolidate power while renegotiating and restructuring
political allegiances with subnational elites to secure stability
(Boone,1998). As regimes change, these hierarchies adjust to reﬂect
the supportive communities and alliances of new dominant ethno-
regional leaders or regimes. Ongoing andmultiple political changes
produce dynamic conﬂict landscapes across states, in which groups
and governments face a shifting rate of opposition, capabilities,
motivations and types of conﬂict.
The spatial implications are similar to alternative subnational
frames, wherein political weight creates spatial variations of power
and inﬂuence. Power pools in ‘included’ areas, and is largely absent
from others, depending on the position of local ethno-regional
groups within political hierarchies. The evident variation therein
creates a landscape of political power across that state as ethnic
communities across Africa are spatially clustered and can be
identiﬁed within a speciﬁc homeland (Scarritt &Mcmillian, 1995).8
Explaining violence occurrence and types
Governance practices that produce power hierarchies are based
on local negotiation, incorporation and repression, and the variable
political relationships produce a landscape of power. This expla-
nation allows for different comparative advantages for groups to
orchestrate conﬂict across a state, but also engenders speciﬁc mo-
tivations for violence as groups seek to retain, change or usurp
power, while bounded by their abilities. If the locations in which
distinct conﬂicts occur differ according to heterogeneous political
status, this is evidence that conﬂict forms are endogenous to group
relationships with governments, and that the process of gover-
nance leads to different and multiple forms of conﬂict, each ac-
cording to groups' means and goals. To relate this theory of
landscape and political hierarchies to violence types, each conﬂict
form is associated with the likely underlying relationship.
Rebel-based civil wars
A civil war's dominant cleavage involves a rebel group battling
against government forces, with the objective of replacing the na-
tional regime or establishing a separate state (Gleditsch et al. 2002;
Sambanis, 2004). Rebel groups are political organizations designed
to counter an established governing regime through violence; they
have a stated political agenda and the group is acknowledged
outside of immediate members. Civil wars are more likely in
countries where groups are marginalized and excluded from power
by a repressive government (Cederman et al. 2011).
Groupsmost likely to engage in civil wars are politically relevant
communities who are not presently beneﬁtting from privileged
C. Raleigh / Political Geography 42 (2014) 92e10396positions in a power hierarchy. Political relevance allows for col-
lective action and the assembly of a signiﬁcant threat, and
marginalization and/or discrimination relative to other commu-
nities serve as motivations. Therefore, civil wars are a form on inter-
elite violence: as rebelling group(s) need to garner signiﬁcant sup-
port to challenge an existing political network, a contest of power
between similarly strong and relevant groups is most likely.9 The
‘contest’ dynamic between large groups is evident in several recent
examples, including the struggle over the Congolese Kivus
(Lemarchand, 2009), Ivory Coast (Boone, 2007), Congo-Brazzaville
(Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999; Lemarchand, 2009), Chad and the
Central African Republic (Giroux, Lanz, & Sguaitamatti, 2009).
Hence, civil war events are most likely to be pursued by both
‘powerless’ and ‘discriminated’ politically relevant groups. Relative
poverty levels will not affect the likelihood of who rebels, as those
are endogenous to positions within the political hierarchy. This
explanation is largely in line with assumptions of contemporary
literature on civil war that gives particular signiﬁcance to ethnic
exclusion and the resulting “grievances” as major sources of civil
war (Cederman et al., 2010, 2011; Gurr, 1993, 2000; Østby et al.,
2009; Stewart, 2008).
Hypothesis 1. Discriminated and powerless groups are more
likely to engage in rebel-based civil wars over other forms of
conﬂict.Political militia violence
Political militia violence is orientated towards shaping the po-
litical power structure at the local, regional and national level. This
violence has increased as a result of political fragmentation and
competition (Branch and Cheeseman, 2009; Bratton & Chang,
2006; Chabal & Daloz, 1999), and in response to the rising level
of checks and balances on the executive power (Choi & Raleigh,
2014). Power distribution across parliaments, judiciaries and the
military, decentralization, and election monitoring increase the
number and power of non-regime elites shaping government pol-
icy. In turn, this leads to high levels of elite competition and frag-
mentation over access to state resources and power across African
states in particular (Brancati, 2007; Lijphart, 1977). Within systems
where political ofﬁce has redistributive implications, incumbents
and opponents have incentives to design forms of violence to
assure access to power (Arriola & Johnson, 2012; Gandhi & Lust-
Okar, 2009; Schedler, 2006; Treisman, 2007). Hence, using
violence to secure a position in government is an effective tool of
competing elites (including members of government) where the
stakes are exceedingly high. The manifestation of such competition
is in the use of militias as personal armies for politicians (e.g. Somali
regional militias), to challenge voters or oppose candidates during
election periods (e.g. Mungiki in Kenya), and ‘unafﬁliated’ pro-
government supplementary squads (e.g. Janjaweed and PDF in
Sudan).Fig. 2. Political relationships and conﬂict spaces.Militias are the violent group choice for elites who aim to cap-
ture or retain power through the strategic and orchestrated use of
violence by a private army10. In choosing this form of conﬂict, those
in power seek to redress perceived power imbalances through
force: challengers seek to shift positions within a governance hi-
erarchy, not to orchestrate a national overthrow or redress local
political disputes. Militia activity is a form of intra-elite violence,
used by those within political hierarchies to threaten, force or
impede political changes (e.g. party militias, election gangs).
Therefore, it follows that militia activity is by, and for, ‘included’
elites, who aim to capture or retain power through the strategic and
orchestrated use of violence.
Hypothesis 2. Those included within regime hierarchies, such as
partners, dominant and monopoly groups, are more likely to use
political militia tactics over other forms of violence.Communal conﬂict
Communal conﬂict largely occurs in geographically ‘peripheral’
spaces, and is strongly associated with speciﬁc, local ‘security’
providers who are members of ethnically distinct long term
policing units, such as those common among Somali clans, or
protector/predator groups engaged in raiding or traditional retri-
bution violence (e.g. Kenyan Pokot Militia). Communal episodes are
typically brief, often deadly, traditionally based contests for local
level resources and micro political dominance. Participation is
strongly linked to local identities, and groups often engage in
violence that takes on the attributes of ‘livelihood defense’ as the
catalysts tend to be land, water, grazing rights, cattle etc. Informally
organized religious militias (e.g. Christian and Muslim attacks) also
fall under this category.
Very few episodes of communal violence involve police or
military forces; most activity is directed towards other communal
groups and or civilians from opposing communities. These power
struggles are locally bound and mainly present in areas deemed
politically irrelevant, as they are populated by small groups which
do not aggregate into communities of regional and national polit-
ical relevance. As research suggests that these groups are often
peripheral to national governments as they have little ‘political
weight’ (Raleigh, 2010a) and are effectively excluded from the po-
litical hierarchy, local political conﬂict is most likely.
Hypothesis 3. Politically irrelevant communities resort to
communal violence at higher levels over other forms of political
contest.
To summarize: the political hierarchies and landscape frame-
work proposes that groups are constrained by their relative posi-
tions within national power hierarchies. Positions determine
conﬂict goals, opponents, and threat potential to regimes. Diver-
gence in conﬂict type is due to government inclusion processes and
group abilities. Distinct violent spaces should therefore consistently
differ by governing relationship: civil wars should predominately
occur in spaces where the government practices discriminatory and
exclusionary practices; militia actions will mainly take place in
areas that are included and integrated into the government struc-
ture; and communal violence will largely occur in zones that are
‘ungoverned’ and unincorporated into the national regime. In turn,
this inﬂuences the risk across groups: powerless and discriminated
groups, relative to other groups in a political hierarchy, choose a
more fatal and long term form of conﬂict; powerful groups engage
with other elites through creating short periods of high violence
and targeted fatalities; and small, local ethnic groups engage in
high levels of contained violence. Ignoring the complex, scaled and
interactive domestic politics de-politicizes conﬂict and mis-
C. Raleigh / Political Geography 42 (2014) 92e103 97identiﬁes cause and triggers.11 See Fig. 2for a representation of
multiple forms of violence within a hypothetical state: instead of a
uniform and generic form of homogenous political instability in
country A, multiple forms can emerge due to local relationships.Change
The motivations and goals of challengers are altered by changes
in relative power, such that advancements or regressions on a po-
litical hierarchy may heighten grievances of civilians, elites or
repressed politically relevant communities. Therefore, as a group
changes position on the political hierarchy, its dominant form of
conﬂict should also adjust. A more inclusive position on the power
hierarchy is the main mechanism for the transition between civil
war andmilitia activity as the dominant form of political violence; a
less inclusive position on the same hierarchy explains the move-
ment from militia to civil war violence.
Hypothesis 4a. : A change to a more inclusive position on a po-
litical hierarchy will correspond to a change from civil war to po-
litical militia activity across localities.
4b. : A change to a more exclusive position on a political hierarchy
will correspond to a change from political militia to civil war ac-
tivity across localities.
Finally, national institutional systems may be a critical facet of
the governance equation as they shape and contain the abilities and
motives of central regimes, and possibly reﬂect howcertain types of
conﬂict become more likely: autocratic and transition regimes
remain open to civil wars due to their limits to inclusion, and
narrow political hierarchy (Hegre et al., 2001). In contrast, demo-
cratic institutions force governments to engage with more ‘part-
ners’, as regimes can no longer build narrow and exclusive
coalitions to pursue their policies and protect themselves. This
leads to fewer motives for civil war as the paths to political change
are more open and permeable, yet democracy produces both
competition and fragmentation amongst political elites onmultiple
scales (Branch& Cheesman, 2009; Berman,1998; Mozaffer, Scarritt,
& Galaich, 2003); political militias are more active in democratizing
states and particularly in periods of competition, such as elections.
Further, as states are forced to democratize, there are changes in
how different groups are integrated (e.g. a higher rate of inclusive
coalitions is necessary in all states excepting those with a winning
ethnic majority); hence more or less inclusion and exclusion is
related to regime type. Yet, there is little in the institutional liter-
ature that associates variation in regimes with subnational in-
centives for the rise of multiple and alternative conﬂicts. Previous
work into how regimes and conﬂict types change in tandemFig. 3. Civil war risk box plot.suggested that a dominant form arises as political participation and
government incentives for social freedoms assume a more central
position in a polity (Tilly, 1985). Hence, regime perspectives cannot
answer subnational queries on concurrence and the lack of spatial
overlap.
Research design
This study uses grid-years as the unit of analysis. The complete
dataset covers Sub-Saharan African states from 1997 to 2011 with
populations over 100,000, wherein each state is divided into
approximately 10 km 10 km units, repeated by year.12 3,800,940
grid-year units are uniquely identiﬁed, and further clustered into
administrative zones (1st, 2nd, and 3rd where available), ethnic
communities, and countries. Conﬂict point data is grafted onto this
grid structure. The sub-national level of analysis is particularly
appropriate in contexts where a particular form or agent of violence
is geographically concentrated. Grid units have the additional
advantage of being disassociated from formal political boundaries
or units of administration, and allow for a robust test of local
characteristics that make locations more or less conﬂict prone.
Conﬂict data are from ACLED's 60,000 disaggregated African
event points from 1997 to 2011 (Raleigh et al., 2010). ACLED has an
‘atomic’ event format, where each event is coded as a daily,
georeferenced, actor-speciﬁc occurrence, allowing for the greatest
possibilities for aggregation and comparison (e.g. all ‘rebel’ actions
or singular group actions; all events by month, etc.), as all event
units are the same across time periods and countries. Further,
ACLED codes violence systematically across several state and non-
state actor types without a fatality-based criterion or pre-deﬁned
conﬂict distinctions.13 Georeferenced conﬂict points are ﬁrst cate-
gorized into distinct ‘types’ (rebel, militia, communal, other), based
on actor goals and self-proclaimed designations; each point is then
associated with the speciﬁc grid-year. All conﬂict units are associ-
ated with a buffer that controls for a slightly larger area and in-
corporates events that occur in grid border regions; the point is
assigned to the grid inwhich the majority of the buffered point lies.
There are three different forms of the dependent variable: 1) an
event count of each type; 2) a dominant conﬂict type; and 3) a
change in dominant conﬂict. A ‘dominant’ count variable records
themost active type of conﬂict in each grid-year, and the number of
events therein. This count controls for singular events by other
types of actors and produces an accurate interpretation of where
distinct types of conﬂicts occur. Three dichotomous variables of
conﬂict type are based on dominant counts: each grid-year with a
dominant rebel count is coded ‘1’; this is repeated for dominant
militia and communal event counts. Conﬂict in the dataset is
distributed as follows: civil war (1.53%), political militia activity
(1.65%), communal conﬂict (.62%), and no conﬂict (96.1%).
The dichotomous ‘change’ variables are based on whether the
dominant form of conﬂict changes during the previous year: militia
change is coded ‘1’ if a country experiences an ‘inclusive’ transition
from civil war to political militia; rebel change is coded ‘1’ if
‘exclusive’ when moving from political militia to civil war.
Governance relationships are derived from the Ethnic Relations
Dataset (EPR) (Cederman et al., 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min,
2009) which provides time varying information on the political
status of ethno-regional groups. Associating each grid squarewith a
local ethnic community involved a three stage process: ﬁrst, a
complete georeferenced list of groups is compiled and mapped;
second, each group is designated as politically relevant or irrele-
vant; and third, the changing governance relationship is ascribed to
each group by year. Creating a complete list of spatially referenced
groups involvedworking across three ethnic data sources for Africa.
The names and locations of groups in the ‘Ethnic Power Relations’
Table 2
Summary variables.
Variable name
and time coverage
Description Scale Source
Conﬂict 1997e2011 Atomic events by agent, date and location, aggregated
into grid squares. A lag variable for previous conﬂict
and spatial summary variable records the number
of conﬂict events in surrounding locations (logged
to control for high counts).
Civil war: .069 (mean) 1.32 (SD) 0e355 (Range)
Civil war dummy: 1.4% Positive 98.6% Negative
Political militia: .053 (mean) 1.25(SD) 0e460 (range)
Political militia dummy: 3.4% Positive 98.6% Negative
Communal violence: .014 (mean) .328(SD) 0e61 (range)
Communal violence dummy: .46% positive 99.54% negative
Local georeferenced to
village and counted
by daily occurrence
Acleddata.com
Infrastructure Length of roads per grid square
26.21 (mean) 45.97 (SD) 0e1171 (range)
Local FAO: Roads of the World
ESRI: African
Roads
Population 2.5 min grid cell population density data
Logged
Mean: 3215
SD: 11,588
Range:0e297,039
Local (10.8 km grid) UNEP/GRID African
population distribution
Urban centers Capital city, administrative capitals, cities (over 50,000)
per grid square. Quartile measures summarized
Local (in decimal degrees) Ciesin
Higher than mean wealth The mean annual rate of income for the state, a dummy
variable indicating whether a grid square was above the mean
Mean dummy: 26.67% positive 73.33% negative
Wealthy grid dummy: 16.21% Positive 83.79 negative
250 km Grids 1995,
2000, 2005.
Gecon data
Ethnic power and relevance Each ethnic group is designated annually as dominant,
senior partners, junior partners, powerless, discriminated or irrelevant.
Politically irrelevant: 27.3% positive 72.7% negative
Discriminated: 3.13% positive 96.87% negative
Powerless: 21.93% positive 78.07% negative
Partners: 29.71% positive 70.29% negative
Dominant/Monopoly: 17.81% positive 82.19% negative
Ethnic
Group-years
(a) Ethnologue
(b) Scarritt & Mozaffar,
1999; Joshua Project
(c) Ethnic Power
Relations Dataset
Democracy POLITY dataset
66, 77, and 88 converted to ‘0’.
All instances over þ5 are coded as consolidated democracies
Democracy: 33.7% positive 66.3% negative
National POLITY
Elections Dummy variables constructed based on the occurrence of an
election (presidential or parliamentary) in a given year
Election years: 22.4% of sample
National African elections
database
GDP Gross domestic product, in 2000 terms
Logged.
23.06 (mean) 1.42 (SD) 19.04e25.95 (range)
National World Bank
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updated Ethnologue ethnicity and language map of Africa, which
provides a spatially referenced map of group homelands. Further,
information on names and relationships of scaled, politically rele-
vant ethno-regional groups by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) sup-
plement the apolitical Ethnologue dataset and more general GEO-
epr set. GEO-epr provides information for just under half of the
continent, and is composed of aggregate group names and regions
(223 groups are identiﬁed overall). The supplementary dis-
aggregated sources are more similar to each other, report on local
and subnational identities, and contain information for over ﬁve
times as many discrete groups as GEO-epr. The ﬁnal list and map
both classify and distinguish sub-groups into identiﬁable ethno-
regional clusters.
After associating each grid squarewith an ethno-regional group,
an annual political relationship status is assigned. To begin, each
group is broadly categorized as politically relevant or irrelevant
from Scarrit and Mozaffer's (1999) list. Groups that are ‘politically
irrelevant’ do not appear as named or associated kin groups in both
GEO-epr and Scarritt &Mozaffar lists. Political irrelevant groups do
not change in their status through the observed time period, as
politically relevant groups do. GEO-epr designates groups as
‘Included’ if from ‘Dominant/Monopoly’ (indicating dominance of
an ethnic community in government) and ‘Partners’ (both seniorand junior associated groups) categories; ‘Excluded’ if from
‘Discriminated’ (ethno-regional communities subject to repres-
sion), ‘Powerlessness’ (ethno-political groups subject to exclusion),
or ‘Autonomy’ categories. Groups who are kin associates of iden-
tiﬁed ‘powerless’ groups are also categorized as such, as are those
that appear in the Scarritt and Mozaffar politically relevant list, but
not in EPR. The dataset has the following distribution: dominant/
monopoly (3.5%), partners (37%), discriminated/powerless (31.5%),
and politically irrelevant (28%)14.
Additional characteristics are grafted onto each grid, including
regional and local information on infrastructure, demographics,
and wealth. Local population and infrastructure are found to be
powerful indicators of civil war clustering (Raleigh & Hegre, 2009);
further regional and group poverty rates is a key explanation in civil
war likelihood (Cederman et al. 2011). A petroleum resource
indictor is included as resource wealth is found to positively affect
opportunity abilities of groups for conﬂict (Basedau & Pierskalla,
2014). A standard suite of national control variables in all models
includes the natural log of a country's GDP, and the year of Presi-
dential Election and whether the state is a qualiﬁed democracy
(Polity scores of or greater thanþ5). A presidential election dummy
variable controls for the effects of electoral competition, and de-
mocracy for institutional governing systems. Each included variable
has been afﬁrmed as signiﬁcant controls in econometric analysis on
Table 3
Logit analysis of dominant conﬂict form.
Model 1* Model 2* Model 3*
Civil war dominance Political militia dominance Communal violence dominance
Political power hierarchy
Powerless/Discriminated .367(.185)** .139(.172) .434(.203)**
Partners (Sn & Jr) .327(.258) .797(.337)** .249(.469)
Dominance .914(.696) .956(.540)* .931(.760)
Over mean wealth .336(.118)** .405(.114)** .092(.221)
Presidential election .376(.267) .328(.238) .134(.278)
Local log population .183(.097)** .405(.052)*** .340(.070)***
Distance to cities .234(.106)** .418(.175)** .124(.151)
Admin capital .273(.112)** .192(.189) .285(.256)
Infrastructure .004(.000)*** .004(.000)*** .005(.000)***
Log (GDP) .203(.136) .034(.144) .150(.239)
Democracy .879(.333)** .510(.333)* .315(.439)
Petro area 1.32(.486)** 1.48(.254)*** 1.64(.349)
Lagged conﬂict typet1 1.57(.176)*** 1.99(.121)*** 1.74(.123)***
Additional civil war lagt2 .38(.136)**
Surrounding violence (Admin 2) .822(.053)*** .627(.071)*** .710(.079)***
Constant 1.99(3.40) 8.63(3.19)** 11.75(5.24)
Log-likelihood 190,706 219,526 112,341
Rho .26 .224 .16
Observations 3,011,910 3,011,910 3,011,910
Countries 42 42 42
(Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis.*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Two-tailed tests).
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all independent variables.
A lagged dependent variable adjusts for autocorrelation within
clusters in the time-varying dataset (Wilson & Butler, 2007); in the
case of civil war, a two-year lag is included as the rate of correlation
rises until two years have passed and decreases substantially
thereafter; a yearly lag variable of each discrete type of conﬂict, as
well as a summary count of surrounding violence in 50 km and
100 km zones. The 100 km district space is chosen as the conﬂict
spatial dependence control.
Two statistical models test the hypotheses: a negative binomial
model for event count dependent variables and a standard logit
model for binary dependent variables of dominant conﬂict form
and change within grid-years. Robust standard errors are clustered
by country.Results15
The results for both logit and count models conﬁrm that there
are clear differences in the spaces of rebel-based civil wars, political
militia activity, and communal violence. These types of violence are
spatially distinct and concurrent. Table 3 presents logit results forFig. 4. Political militia risk box plot.the three types of conﬂict: Model 1 conﬁrms that the relative po-
sition in a political hierarchy is a strong explanation for conﬂict
type: areas characterized by political powerlessness and discrimi-
nation experiencemore rebel events than those in partnershipwith
regimes or with a monopoly on power. The immediate past and
present conﬂict environment supplements risks presented by local
physical and demographic geography: populated, accessible zones
that are conﬂict active in the present and near past experience an
additional risk. Relative wealth exerts a limited positive inﬂuence
on the occurrence of civil war events. As predicted by the theory
and hypotheses 1, rebellion is more likely to occur in areas excluded
from the regime where competition between regime and opposi-
tion elites is highest. Fig. 3 displays a risk box plot for civil war rebel
violence where the mean rate and range of violence in ‘excluded’
areas is up to twice that of ‘included’ or ‘irrelevant’ areas.
In model 2, political militia violence is most common in areas
characterized by regime inclusion, whether in the form of junior
and senior regime partnerships, or regime dominance. Both ‘part-
nered’ and ‘dominant’ regions are twice as likely to experience
political militia violence over ‘excluded’ positions on the political
hierarchy. This supports hypothesis 2, and is robust when con-
trolling for the presence of a civil war within a state (to reduce theFig. 5. Communal violence risk box plot.
Table 5
Change logit analysis of dominant conﬂict form.
Change from militia
to civil war dominance
Change from civil war
to militia dominance
Change to included Status .538(.309)*
Change to excluded status .599(.335)*
Local log population .370(.053)*** .416(.051)***
Distance to cities .489(.143)** .456(.146)**
Admin capital .187(.157) .244(.161)
Infrastructure .004(.000)** .004(.001)***
Log (GDP) .013(.124) .053(.140)
Elections .329(.254) .433(.215)**
Democracy .346(.253) .346(.256)
Over mean wealth .114(.142) .184(.132)
Petro area 1.09(.224)*** .105(.212)**
Surrounding violence .275(.048)*** .549(.051)***
Constant 6.92(2.89)** 8.72(3.22)**
Log-likelihood 169,647 164,732
R2 7% 12%
Observations 3,011,910 164,732
Countries 42 42
(Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis.*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Two-tailed tests)
Lagged violence.
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and without such controls. These results are consistent with the
theoretical expectation that competition and fragmentation
amongst included elites is a primary determinant of militia
violence. Overall, the differences in where militia violence and civil
war events occur largely differ on how governments engage with
the populations, yet the economic and demographic characteristics
of environments experiencing both are similarly wealthier,
resource abundant, and accessible parts of states. Fig. 4 displays a
risk box plot for political militia violence where the mean rate and
range of additional violence in ‘included’ areas are more than three
times the rate across other political categorizations.
In model 3, communal violence is less likely to occur in those
areas characterized by discriminated, powerless, and dominant
political positions. Powerless areas return a signiﬁcant, negative
sign compared to politically irrelevant places (the reference group);
partnered and dominant areas are insigniﬁcant. Unlike the other
forms of armed violence, relativewealth is not a factor in areas with
higher rates of communal violence. Previously violent, resource
wealthy, accessible, rural areas are more likely to have a communal
event. National characteristics are not strong predictors of
communal violence, although fewer civil wars are found in demo-
cratic states, and militia violence weakly corresponds. Fig. 5 dis-
plays a risk box plot for communal violence where the mean rate
and range is up to four times the violence risk in other political
areas.
Table 4 presents the negative binomial model results which
largely conﬁrm the conclusions of the logit models, but with the
following differences: in the count models for civil wars, higher
event counts also occur in dominant areas. This is largely in line
with expectations that civil wars eventually descend upon capital
cities, and into the territory of the powerful (Raleigh & Hegre,
2009). Militia event frequency increases during election periods,
and in areas of higher than mean wealth. All other key variables
results relating to ethno-political hierarchies and relative income
are stable and conﬁrmed.
Table 5 presents logit results for change. For comparison and
robustness checks, models 7 and 8 show results with the same set
of independent variables used in models 1e6, but the dependentTable 4
Negative binominal analysis of event counts.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Civil war Political militia Communal
violence
Political power hierarchy
Powerless & Discriminated .527(.208)** .104(.149) .595(.190)**
Partners (Sn & Jr) .348(.272) .900(.316)** .129(.389)
Dominance & Monopoly 1.41(.512)** 1.11(.533)** 1.13(.788)
Over mean wealth .166(.153) .283(.102)** .092(.162)
Presidential election .526(.223)** .353(.253) .331(.222)
Local log population .217(.106)** .427(.053)*** .360(.057)***
Distance to cities .352(.128)** .448(.148)** .195(.127)
Admin capital .409(.128)** .311(.188)* .428(.238)*
Infrastructure .004(.000)*** .005(.000)*** .006(.001)***
Log (GDP) .419(.134)** .056(.150) .155(.203)
Democracy 1.11(.299)*** .497(.299)* .503(.422)
Petro area 1.79(.570)** 1.73(.267)*** 1.94(.378)***
Lagged conﬂict typet1 1.21(.102)*** 2.48(.131)*** 2.01(.159)***
Additional civil war lagt2 1.77(.130)***
Surrounding
violence (Admin 2)
.705(.124)*** .882(.107)*** 1.04(.156)***
Constant 4.59(3.19) 14.16(3.26)*** 19.12(4.47)***
Ln (year) 1 1 1
Log n alpha 3.14 2.89 3.99
Observations 3,011,910 3,011,909 3,011,910
Countries 42 42 42
(Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis.*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Two-tailed tests).variables are whether the dominant conﬂict in a grid-year differed
from that in previous years (lags of 2e3 years). The shifts are either
from (1) dominant militia events to civil war or (2) dominant civil
war events tomilitia. The table shows that a higher rate of inclusion
within political hierarchies is a conclusive explanation for shifts
between civil war and militia events, and that a transition from an
included to an excluded status on a political hierarchy is associated
with a shift in violence frommilitia to civil war events. Hypothesis 4
is therefore accepted, as these results indicate that groups have
agency to change the form of political violence they engage inwhen
the political parameters shift and new motivations, opportunities
and goals emerge. However, it is not an immediate change, as 2e3
years are necessary for groups to organize and motivate followers
for alternative forms of conﬂict goals.
The results for change between militia and civil war show minor
differences in the effect of key independent variables: both suggest
that positions on political hierarchies, concurrent violence and area
characteristics are signiﬁcant indicators. By and large, concurrent
temporal shifts are less relevant, barring the signiﬁcance of elec-
tions in motivating increased militia violence.
In summary, hypotheses 1e4 are fully or partially conﬁrmed; in
count models, civil war events occur in large number in dominant
areas, although there is less risk of civil war events in ‘included’
positions of the political hierarchy; rebel events are a form of inter-
elite competition between included and excluded politically rele-
vant ethno-regional groups. Political militia events largely occur in
areas characterized by regime inclusion; hence this form of political
violence is an intra-elite form of competition. Communal violence
is most common in areas where politically irrelevant groups reside,
and less likely to occur in areas characterized by regime inclusion or
exclusion. Finally, as political relationships change, so too do con-
ﬂict forms; this is evident in the shifts in militia to civil war events
across space. Each analysis is robust to several alternations to the
dependent variable, the main independent variables, stepwise de-
letions and bootstrapping.Discussion and conclusion
The topography of political power across contemporary African
states creates variable forms and spaces of conﬂict. This analysis
conﬁrms that political hierarchies and power landscapes are strong
explanations for spatially distinct, concurrent and changing types
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indicating that ethnic exclusion and the resulting grievances are
major sources of civil war (Cederman et al. 2011; Østby et al., 2009).
Yet, civil wars are only one form of violence within the larger
conﬂict landscape that emerges across Africa as a response to
governance: while discriminated and powerless groups choose civil
war, other groups within the same state oppose regimes in alter-
nate ways that maximize their abilities. These groups consider the
incentives and opportunities provided by their position to shape
their struggle within the political environment. Concurrent forms
of internal political violence differ in practice, scale, goals, under-
lying political context and consequences.
Conﬂict literature on African states generally presents a poor
conceptualization of power, and a myopic understanding of the
production and manifestation of all political violence. This study
asserts that political violence within African states is a response to,
and shaped by, the type of governance practiced by political elites;
the evident uneven development and political inclusionwithin and
across African states creates a landscape of variable conﬂict types
and risks.
From this analysis, inclusion and marginalization cannot fully
account for the range and occurrence of violence. Regimes create
political hierarchies to organize how they will be represented
across territory: they incorporate allies, integrate potential regional
rivals, placate other powerful elites and repress threatening groups.
Positions within that hierarchy and landscape shape how groups
challenge sitting governments, the form that opposition takes, and
the conditions under which it will be successful. This hierarchy can
be understood spatially as a political landscape, where group
homelands are associated with different levels of political power,
dominant conﬂict types and potential. Other frameworks designed
to explain disaggregated conﬂict suffer from an almost exclusive
focus on civil war, a lack of information on how regimes create
incentives and disincentives for political violence, and a dismissal
of group agency and reactions to changes in political environments.
The political hierarchy framework integrates explanations of hori-
zontal and vertical inequalities to produce dynamic and variable
explanations. It is a direct counter to reactive and static in-
terpretations of conﬂict geography, risks and agents.
The implications for violence across Sub-Saharan Africa are that
states can have complex conﬂict geographies, involving violence
with variable levels of lethality, national security signiﬁcance and
duration. The key factor to consider is at which scale the various
contests are being fought: underlying the subnational contexts and
the presence of different manifestations of opposition/violence is
the political logic and process of governance across African states.
The structure and consequences of African governance are critical
to conﬂict researchers seeking to better understand how geopo-
litical fault lines emerge within a state: local politicians are not
simply pawns of national elites, but organize and mobilize to
receive public goods to compensate for their support. A breakdown
in these relationships can cause national instability. As regimes
change, corresponding allies, policies and enemies shift, as does the
political geography of power within a state. For the purposes of
understanding the creation of violent opposition, the most egre-
gious consequences of ethno-political hierarchies are that they
create a shrinking political arena (Kasﬁr, 1976) and encourage
strategic uses of violence to attain power. In practice, regimes create
a ‘zero-sum’ political atmosphere where those outside of favored
ethnic status are not afforded representation based on public
support, demography or ideology. Those who are excluded can
form an opposition for which violence may become a path to po-
wer. Further, these relationships are dynamic, conﬂict types and
rates are territorially bounded and not closely associated to total
poverty or total marginalization, but dynamic relative powerpositions and status. African conﬂict therefore requires simulta-
neously temporal, spatial and disaggregated explanations.
But is Africa unique? African states are substantially more un-
derdeveloped and have a higher risk of state failure than other
post-colonial countries. This is largely due to the extent and depth
of client politics, wherein the regime leaders use public funds for
personal discretion and the power structure in the state is largely
conﬁned to ethno-regional hierarchies and associations of the po-
wer elites. The effects of widespread and frequent conﬂict on Af-
rican democratic stability and economic growth are major concerns
for the global community: internal political instability reverses
development progress (Collier et al., 2003) through weakening
governing institutions and creating conﬂict traps. Such violence has
long term and detrimental effects on the welfare and health of
citizens through reduced life expectancy (Ghobarah, Huth, &
Russett, 2004), continued underdevelopment, unstable demo-
cratic transitions (Hegre et al., 2001), weakened livelihoods and
state failure (Clapham, 1998). Yet neither democracy nor develop-
ment are complete solutions for African violence: civil war may be
decreasing, but alternate forms of political violence are growing
forms of opposition. Without more concerted efforts to understand
how governance creates e rather than curtails e conﬂict, such
instability is likely to continue.Acknowledgements
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Endnotes
1 An exception to this is Le Billon (2001) who captures how resource geographies
structure the actions and structure of groups.
2 A politically violent event occurs when one or more groups use force on a speciﬁc
date and in a location. Particular aggregations of atomic events into other categories
(e.g. urban unrest, coups, rebellions etc.) are not determined a-priori within ACLED.
3 These common forms are not exhaustive: political violence includes rioting/pro-
testing, mutinies etc.
4 In Table 1, an ‘active’ count is created for each form of conﬂict by calculating the
annual country mean number of grid events, then classifying those which equal or
surpass that total during the speciﬁc year. This reduces the effect of low/singular
events.
5 Recent work on climate change-conﬂict uses the capacity framework for
communal and social conﬂict.
6 Pastoralist groups, clustered into distinct and often-small ethnic communities, are
an apt example of the politically irrelevant .
7 For example, a member of the politically relevant ‘Anambra’ community in Nigeria
uses that identity for local political contexts, aggregates with other communities
into the ‘Igbo’ identity in regional contests and is subsumed under the nationally-
relevant ‘Southern’ community in national contests.
8 The assumption underlying each ethnic dataset, and this analysis, is that African
ethno-regional groups cluster in space.
9 The ‘strength’ distinction is relative: a rebelling group needs to be able to sufﬁ-
ciently challenge a seated government, and the strength and capacities of gov-
ernments vary signiﬁcantly.
10 Militias are used by multiple types of elites, including governments (pro-gov-
ernment party gangs like Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF) and opposition leaders (pro-op-
position party gangs); on occasion, rebel leaders engage militias.
11 Groups with mobilization potential (either by size, support, or history) populate
all categories except ‘political irrelevance’. Political irrelevance remains a category
as small ethno-regional communities are not engaged in national politics, but self-
identify as a group and are powerholders on the local level.
12 Both Rwanda and Burundi are excluded from the models, as the ethno-regional
geography between main groups is indistinguishable. Additionally, states with
populations under 100,000 are excluded because governance, demographic and
violence patterns are unique and distinct from larger states.
13 ACLED deﬁnes political violence as ‘the use of force by a group with a political
purpose or motivation’.
C. Raleigh / Political Geography 42 (2014) 92e10310214 Sub-Saharan Africa only. Comparisons across ethnic sets are available in the
Appendix.
15 Additional results using different ethnic distinctions, variations on the hierarchy
variable and samples are available in the Appendix.
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